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Abstract 
 
As it is shown in the [1], the interaction between the natural 
monopoly (next NM) and the region is expedient to be carried out on the basis of a 
joint development railway transport program in this region. The project 
configuration is an investment structure into ongoing project by stakeholders and, 
hence, this is a structure of incomes as consequences of project implementation. In 
this paper we tested a method agreement of cooperation programs. Target 
parameters are effectiveness ratio of the regional authorities and the NM. 
 
Keywords: Developing a cooperation program, Mathematical modeling, Pareto 
efficiency. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Participatory share of the parties in each project and efficiency and solvency 
depending on it, have to be reconciled by high-performance cooperation program 
configuration of a NM and certain subject of the RF. This is defined by the 
following parameters: 
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 - the amount of funds allocated to the i-project NM, where   1,2, … , 	; 

  - the amount of funds allocated to the i-project be the regional 
administration, where   1,2, … , 	; 
The overall effectiveness ratio of the NM program [1-3] in the case (x,y) is:  
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In the same way the ratios for the second party of interaction in the case (x,y) – 
regional administration - are:  
Δ(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Now there is a problem to find a situation (x,y), where the efficiency , 
 
satisfies the NM, and the solvency change Δ(, 
 meets the regional 
administration’s requirements, i.e. the common cooperation program in the 
configuration (x,y) can be accepted by both sides. 
To solve the problem of searching the suitable situation (x,y)  the best 
variant is game theory. Its mathematical apparatus allows choosing according to 
some criteria variants from all possible number of variants that satisfy both parties 
according to formulated interests of parties-players.  
The function named as the Rating of the situation (x,y) for the regional 
administration ", 
 is defined analogically.  
Among all the situations ;<  <, 
< , where   1, … ,= , obtained 
during solving the linear programming problem, let’s choose the situations that are 
optimal according to  Pareto criterion [4—8], i.e. the situations ;∗  ∗, 
∗ 
where there are no more preferred for both players situations ;  , 
, i.e. such 
that: 
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, Δ(∗, 
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. 
Here @, 
 is the rating of situation (x,y) for the NM,  
", 
 is the rating of situation (x,y) for the regional administration.  
According to the results of problem solving there is a set of Pareto efficiency 
situations ;∗  ∗, 
∗ 
By means of negotiations and discussion on the basis of calculations made 
above, from the limited set one can choose such situation, i.e. the configuration of 
the common program, that satisfies both parties by the effectiveness ratio and 
solvency, and, hence, by the income level, expenditure level and  its influence for 
the socio-economic performance of the region. 
 
2 Experiments 
 
The proposed algorithm with a set of situations, acceptable for negotiations, 
provides objective arguments in favor of certain configurations of common 
cooperation program that allows simplifying and predetermining the process of 
negotiations about approval the program significantly. This paragraph is devoted to  
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the practical implementation of the developed in [1] algorithm of approval a 
cooperation program between PLC “Russian Railways” (next RR) and a subject of 
Russian Federation.  
It is considered that a subject of Russian federation is interested in the 
following projects developing: The development of transport process and increase 
production at a “K” plant; The high-speed train to the airport; The building of the 
access road to the south terminal. And RR is interested in the following projects: 
The allocation of parts for rolling stock production in the region; The movement 
organization of a high-speed train to the airport. In the course of the algorithm 
operations and in the result of programs merger, the common program of 
interaction was developed. It contains: 
 
A1. (Cost 70) The development of transport process and increase production at a 
“K” plant; 
A2. (Cost 50) The high-speed train to the airport; 
A3. (Cost 60) The allocation of parts for rolling stock production in the region; 
A4. (Cost 300) The building of the access road to the south terminal.  
 
Let’s consider carried out experiments. Let’s for the experiments λ  1 , 
C  0,95. 
 
 
Part 
Rate Inputs 
RR Region RR, Δv Region, ΔW 
A1 3 3 160 4000 
A2 4 1 40 1350 
A3 2 4 80 30,8 
A4 1 2 970 10737 
Sum 
 
 1250 16118 
 
Table 1. Common experiment input data  
 
 
Experiment #1.  
For the algorithm operability illustration let’s illustrate the calculations in the 
case of absence opportunities to finance a cooperation program for both sides. As it 
was expected in the case of financial capability lack, the only possible scenario (it 
is Pareto efficiency) is located in the zero values.  
 
Experiment #2.     
Let’s consider the situation where one of the sides is ready to implement one 
of the projects by their own, while there is a lack of financing for all other projects 
(Table 2).  
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Experiment #2 Experiment #3 
RR Region RR Region 
min max min max min max min max 
0 20 20 45 30 60 40 45 
0 0 20 45 0 20 20 45 
10 20 0 30 40 60 20 30 
50 300 0 100 50 200 20 150 
 
Table 2. Experiments input data 
 
 
The results of the experiment are ΔW  10736,   0,922. There is the 
only one Pareto efficiency situation.   
In this situation, indeed, there are only two possible versions: to finance or 
not to finance the fourth project. A computer in the course of solving the linear 
programming problem has identified the most optimal distribution of shares of 
funding, based on the obtaining effectiveness ratios and solvency. It is hard to 
imagine at random, i.e. without algorithm usage, that a responsible for negotiations 
employee of RR can identify the most advantageous ratio of 229.70 to 70.30 in 
financing of the fourth project (Fig.4). 
 
 
   
Fig. 4. Variants of the distribution 
the funding share of the 
cooperation program. 
Fig. 5. The meanings of efficiency and 
solvency change in respect of the elaborated 
variants of the experiment #4 
 
 
Experiment #3.  
The situation of excess funding for some projects is considered in this 
experiment, i.e. such projects which implementation requires a minimum 
investment amount (Table 2). The experimental results are shown in the Table 3. 
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#  W∆  
Rate 
RR Region 
1 0.925   14767 2 4 
2 0.926   14767 3 5 
3 0.925   16117 1 1 
4 0.926   14767 5 6 
5 0.925   16117 4 2 
  
The Pareto efficiency situations in plane efficiency-solvency are illustrated in 
the fig. 5.  Meanings are especially close, because in fact the distribution of funds 
for the first and the third projects is fixed and it corresponds the minimal 
investments that parties are ready to make. The distribution of share of funding for 
each of five sceneries is shown in the Fig.6.  
       
 
       
 
Fig.6. The graphs of the distribution the funding share in the experiment #4 in 
respect of five Pareto efficiency scenarios 
 
Results 
 
The proposed algorithm of elaboration technique and approval a cooperation 
program has been tested on various baseline data and it has demonstrated its 
operability applying to different variants of interaction. The offered unimprovable 
configurations of cooperation program financing meet the theoretic-mathematical  
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requirements and they correspond the intuitive explanation about mutually 
beneficial interaction that is most appreciated. The algorithm of technique at 
boundary conditions has been checked. In the case when all parties have enough 
resources to implement projects, the meanings of Pareto efficiency situations are 
close enough. It corresponds to common sense (the available resources are enough 
for the all proposed projects). Variants of program financing, generated by the 
algorithm, are deliberated and well though-out because they are based on the 
proven interaction valuations (efficiency and solvency change). The detection of 
Pareto efficiency variants of possible situations is carried out on the basis of 
calculated forecasted efficiency of the all cooperation program. 
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